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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR CLARI­
FICATION OF THE PRIVACY RIGHT-Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Li­
brary, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 
(1978). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right of privacy, while one of the most valued rights held by 
an individual, is also the one right subject to the most inconsistent 
treatment by the judiciary} At first glance the privacy right seems 
inherently attractive. In actuality, however, this right has seldom 
been extended to its logical conclusion. The concept of privacy is 
subject to wide interpretation; thus, the extensive body of law that 
has developed around the privacy notion can best be characterized 
by its "analytical confusion."2 The United States Supreme Court 
has done little to rectify this problem. By denying certiorari or refus­
ing to issue a full opinion in several key cases,3 the Court continually 
has avoided delineating the exact nature of privacy protection and 
has left minimal guidelines for the lower courts. This reluctance has 
resulted in continued confusion and inconsistencies among lower 
court decisions.4 
A primary example of the Court's reluctance to specify the ac­
tual dimensions of the privacy right is evidenced by the recent denial 
of certiorari to the Pennsylvania case, Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free 
I. See, e.g., Andrew v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 
1975) (rule barring employment of unwed patents in school system insufficiently related 
to any legitimate objective); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971) (up­
holding state university'S rejection of homosexual's application for position in campus 
library), cerl. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 
F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (teacher may not be fired for "immorality" on evidence of 
consultation with doctor about abortion); Mindel v. United States Civil Servo Comm'n, 
312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (court invalidated dismissal of postal clerk for living 
with unmarried woman); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375,"82 
Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969) (court invalidated dismissal of school teacher for an isolated past 
homosexual act). 
2. Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1161 (1974). 
3. See, e.g., Hollenbaugh V. Carnegie Free Library. 439 U.S. 1052 (1978); Doe v. 
Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976); McConnell V. Anderson, 405 U.S. 1046 
(1972). 
4. See cases cited note 1 supra. 
171 
172 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:171 
Library.s Hollenbaugh involved the dismissal of two employees 
from a public library; solely on the basis of their living arrangement. 
The employees were living together without the formality of mar­
riage.7 The employer-library determined that the individuals' job 
performance was adversely affected because the community was 
aware of their domestic situation.s As there is little doubt that the 
traditional family structure is changing9 and, as an increasingly large 
number of Americans live together without the formality of mar­
riage,1O the unanswered question of how much protection should be 
afforded to a consensual, heterosexual relationship outside of mar­
riage is quite significant. l1 
The major problem the courts hav~ had to deal with in this area 
is the lack of a ch~ar definition of "privacy," that is, what the concept 
actually encompasses. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 12 the United 
States Supreme Court introduced the vague term "zone of privacy"13 
to help define what kinds of activity would be protected under the 
umbrella of the privacy right. Unfortunately, this zone never has 
been awarded specific boundaries and, thus, the development of the 
privacy right has been the subject of much inconsistency. In an ef­
fort to clarify the privacy right and its varying degrees of protec­
tion,14 this right can be divided into two general categories: (1) The 
procedural aspect, stemming from the fourth amendment; and 
5. 405 F. Supp. 629 (W.O. Pa. 1975), rev'd and remanded in part, 545 F.2d 382 (3d 
Cir. 1976), on remand, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.O. Pa. 1977), aJidmem., 578 F.2d 1374 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978). 
6. The Carnegie Free Library was deemed public because there was a significant 
state involvement in the library's operation. 545 F.2d at 384-85. Thus, the element of 
state action, necessary to maintain any kind of civil rights suit was fulfilled. Id. This 
particular aspect of the case was the sole aspect addressed by the court the first time the 
case was presented. 405 F. Supp. 629 (W.O. Pa. 1975), rev'd and remanded, 545 F.2d 382 
(3d Cir. 1976). It was only after the requisite state action was established that the district 
court ruled on the merits. 436 F. Supp. at 1328. 
7. 436 F. Supp. at 1331. 
8. Id. at 1332. 
9. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 
1157, 1159 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. 
10. Id. at 1289-90. 
11. Id. at 1290. This relationship is protected only in the context of consenting 
adults. 
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court held unconstitutional a Connecti­
cut statute that made it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent 
conception. Justice Oouglas, writing for the majority, found the statute to violate the 
right of marital privacy. Id. at 485-86. 
13. Id. at 485. 
14. Comment, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 
64 CALIF. L. REv. 1447 (1976). See generally Note, supra note 2. 
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(2) the substantive aspect, stemming from the combination of the pe­
numbra, IS fourteenth, and ninth amendments. While these separate 
aspects may overlap in many instances, greater and more consistent 
protection has been afforded to the procedural branch of the privacy 
right because its source of protection is derived directly from a spe­
cific constitutional amendment. The aspect that has generated the 
most interest in the last decade, however, has been the generally less 
protected substantive branch ofthe privacy right. 16 This is because 
the notion of personal autonomy, which is concerned with an indi­
vidual's ability to exercise control over the most personal aspects of 
his life,n is not explicitly defined or mentioned anywhere in the 
United States Constitution. IS Thus, it must be a primary goal of the 
Supreme Court to clarify the dimensions of the "privacy zone" with 
full opinions that reveal clear analysis and reasoning, providing the 
lower courts with a foundation upon which to base their decisions. 
This note examines the right of privacy. The major vehicle for 
this examination is Hollenbaugh and Justice Marshall's dissent to the 
denial of certiorari. Part II of this note examines the evolution of the 
right of privacy. Hollenbaugh and the various factors that should be 
focused on during judicial review are discussed in parts III and IV. 
This note concludes in part V by ,urging the Court to set forth clear 
standards for protection of the right of privacy in an effort to provide 
other courts with the necessary guidance. 
15. Justice Douglas analyzed the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments 
individually and found that each possessed a penumbra of rights. One right examined 
was the peripheral first amendment right of association. The association of people is not 
mentioned explicitly in the Constitution or its Bill of Rights. But, as Justice Douglas 
stated in Griswold, NAACP v. Alabama protected the " 'freedom to associate and privacy 
in one's association.''' 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 
(1958». Moreover, he noted that the freedom of association was a ''peripheral'' first 
amendment right: "In other words, the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy 
is protected from governmental intrusion." This case along with others suggest ''that 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras that help give them life and 
substance.... Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Id. Thus, Justice Douglas 
concluded that collectively these amendments along with their penumbras constituted 
the proper source for a constitutional right of privacy. 
16. See text accompanying notes 50-77 for a complete discussion of the develop­
ment of the privacy right. 
17. Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection lor Personal Lifestyle, 62 COR­
NELL L. REV. 563, 564 (1977). This autonomy is denominated "lifestyle choice" in the 
Wilkinson & White article. The two terms are synonymous, however, for the purposes of 
this article. 
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
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II. EVOLUTION OF PRIVACY 
A. Justice Douglas And His Concept OfPrivacy 
It came as no surprise to the legal world that Justice William O. 
Douglas was the author of Griswold, which finally articulated a basis 
for a constitutional right of privacy. 19 Known as a great protector of 
individual rights,20 Justice Douglas could be depended upon to 
speak out whenever he believed a freedom was threatened.21 "There 
is one liberty he championed with special vigor, the right of pri­
vacy."22 For Justice Douglas, privacy meant being able to separate 
oneself from the rest of society: to keep the government off the back 
of the individual,23 Justice Douglas once stated: 
[I]f people are let alone in [their] choices, the right of privacy will 
pay dividends in character and integrity. The strength of our sys­
tem is the dignity, the resourcefulness, and the independence of 
our people. Our confidence is in their ability as individuals to 
make the wisest choice. That system cannot flourish if regimenta­
tion takes hold. The right of privacy. . . is a powerful deterrent 
to anyone who would control men's minds.24 
Throughout his career, Justice Douglas demonstrated great re­
spect for the rights of the individual. He held those notions associ­
ated with individuality, such as nonconformity and self-fulfi11ment,25 
as cherished rights sacred to each individual and thus deserving of 
constitutional protection. As his personal philosophy of individual.; 
ity and personal autonomy took form, Justice Douglas tried to de­
velop those concepts into legal theories and incorporate them into 
relevant court decisions.26 In early 1950 Justice Douglas began to 
advocate, in both judiciaP7 and nonjudiciaP8 writings, a right of pri­
19. 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
20. See W. DOUGLAS, AN ANATOMY OF LIBERTY (1963). 
21. Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587, 587 (1977); see Note, Toward 
a Constitutional Theory of Individuality: The Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87 
YALE L.I. 1579 (1978). 
22. Bazelon, supra note 21, at 587. 
23. Id. 
24. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, I., 
dissenting). 
25. Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory ofIndividuality: The Privacy Opinions of 
Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.I. 1579, 1588-89 (1978). 
26. See Note, supra note 25, at 1588-89 nn.28-32 for a brief account of Iustice 
Douglas' early privacy statements. 
27. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 444 (1957) (Douglas, I., dissent­
ing); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445 (1956) (Douglas, I., dissenting); Public 
Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952) (Douglas, I., dissenting). 
28. See W. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION (1970); W. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF 
THE PEOPLE (1958); W. DOUGLAS, RUSSIAN IOURNEY (1956). 
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vacy based on the Constitution. In response to increased threats of 
governmental interference into the personal privacy arena, Justice 
Douglas emerged as a strong advocate of personal liberties and soon 
became known as the protector of individual rights.29 Because he 
felt that the right to be left alone was at the very foundation of any 
personal freedom,30 a specific constitutional source for the right of 
privacy was not overwhelmingly important to him. He saw privacy 
as a natural right of man.31 
Justice Douglas reiterated and expanded these views in many of 
his opinions. In his dissent to Poe v. Vl/mon,32 Justice Douglas 
stated that "privacy is not drawn from the blue" but, rather, "ema­
nates from the totality of the constitutional scheme ...."33 It was 
this philosophy that lead to the penumbra theory first enunciated by 
Justice Douglas in Griswold. He based a right of privacy upon a 
combination of several amendments that, when viewed collectively, 
constitute a protective penumbra.34 While it was a victory for Justice 
Douglas to capture a majority for creating a privacy right with a 
constitutional source, it was also a defeat because he had to retreat 
from his natural rights approach to appease his brethren.35 Thus, 
while Justice Douglas successfully created this right of privacy based 
on a "penumbra theory," drawing justification from specific provi­
sions of the Constitution, he was forced to abandon his concept of an 
expansive right of personal autonomy. Unfortunately, the courts 
have yet to integrate Justice Douglas' theory of autonomy into their 
decisions; and the actual development of the privacy right has been 
marred by limitation and inconsistency. 
29. See Note, supra note 25, at 1580-87. 
30. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissent­
ing). Justice Douglas asserted that passengers' rights of privacy were violated by a pri­
vately owned streetcar company's decision to broadcast radio programs on the cars. 
31. Note, supra note 25, at 1584. 
32. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
33. Id. at 521. 
34. See note 11 supra. 
35. While Justice Douglas felt privacy was"an inherent right of man not based on 
any specific constitutional guarantee, his brethren apparently did not agree. They were 
not ready to give protection to his more expansive, personal autonomy, notion of privacy. 
Thus, in order to obtain a majority of his fellow Justices, Justice Douglas developed a 
more limited right of privacy based on the penumbra. In their concurring opinions, Jus­
tices Goldberg, Harlan, and White derived the constitutional right of privacy, upon one 
specific amendment, although they differed as between the ninth or fourteenth. See· 
Note, supra note 25, at 1599-1600. 
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B. Development Of The Privacy Right 
The development of an independent privacy right began before 
any constitutionally based premise specifically was mentioned. Al­
though the early privacy opinions usually were based on the more 
concrete foundation of either the first or fourth amendment,36 the 
right of privacy often was mentioned in dictum.37 As early as 1928, 
in his eloquent and influential dissent to Olmsteadv. United States,38 
Justice Brandeis stated that "the right to be let alone [was] the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
man."39 
Justice Brandeis' legal theories helped shape Justice Douglas' 
own theories40 on privacy. This was evident in Justice Douglas' ma­
jority opinion in Griswold, the first case to award privacy a constitu­
tional basis. Following an examination of the first,41 third,42 
fourth,43 fifth,44 and ninth amendments45 and the rights protected 
under each amendment, Justice Douglas based his theory on the pe­
36. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance 
law violated first amendment rights of Amish children); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967) (tapped telephone booth violated fourth amendment); Prince v. Massachu­
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (distributi9n of religious material by minor valid under first 
amendment); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent­
ing) (unauthorized wiretapping by police violated the fourth amendment); Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (compelling production of personal papers in a crimi­
nal trial violates the fourth amendment). 
37. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Although this decision 
was based on the fourth amendment protection against illegal search and seizure, "the 
protection of a person's general right to privacy" was continually mentioned throughout 
Justice Stewart's opinion. Id. at 350 (emphasis in original). 
38. 	 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Olmstead was overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967). Katz relied heavily on the principles espoused by Justice Brandeis in his 
dissent. 277 U.S. at 471. 
39. 	 277 U.S. at 478. 
The makers of our Constitutiort undertook to secure conditions favorable 
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual 
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the 
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They 
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and 
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
man. 
Id. 
40. 	 See Note, supra note 25, at 1581 n.12. 
41. 	 381 U.S. at 482-83. 
42. 	 Id. at 484. 
43. 	 Id. at 484-85. 
44. 	 Id. 
45. 	 Id. at 484. 
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numbra.46 Thus, it was decided that there existed a vague zone of 
privacy based on several fundamental guarantees that included the 
right of marital privacy.47 Although Justice Douglas gave the right 
of privacy a substantive basis, his opinion lacked the specific stan­
dards and limits needed to guide development of this doctrine. 
While written from the heart, his opinion left little that could sustain 
intensive analysis48 and, thus, prompted much criticism.49 
In his concurring opinion to Griswold, Justice Goldberg, joined 
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan,50 found that the right 
of 	privacy derived its source from the ninth amendment. 51 After 
reiterating Olmstead and noting the fourteenth amendment liberty 
reference in Meyer v. Nebraska,52 Justice Goldberg argued that the 
ninth amendment made it clear that the framers of the Constitution 
intended to protect all fundamental rights, not only those specifically 
mentioned in the first eight amendments. 53 Justice Goldberg be­
lieved that those additional values were no less fundamental -merely 
because they were not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.54 
Although it seemed apparent to the Court that the zone of privacy 
encompassed the marital relationship, it was unclear whether this 
privacy right, recognized in Griswold, was broad enough to include 
the unmarried individual. 
46. 	 See note IS supra. 
47. 	 381 U.S. at 485. 
48. 	 Wilkinson & White, supra note 17, at 564. 
49. See, e.g., Gross, The Concept ofPrivacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34,40-46 (1967); 
Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: 
The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235, 244 (1965); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional 
Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670, 677-78 (1973). 
50. 	 381 U.S. at 486. 
51. 	 Id. at 487. 
52. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 

While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus 

guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included 

things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it-denotes not merely free­

dom from bodily restraint but also [for example) the right ... to marry, estab­

lish a home and bring up children. . . . 
Id. at 399. 
53. 	 381 U.S. at 490-92. 
54. 	 As one commentator stated: 
The Ninth Amendment precludes an inference that the open-ended provi­
sions of the Constitution implicate only those values specified elsewhere in the 
text. The Ninth Amendment was enacted. . . to embody in the Constitution 
the beliefof the Framers that there are additional fundamental rights, protected 
from government infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights 
specifically mentioned in the first eight Amendments. 
Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1173. 
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In 1972 the Supreme Court was presented with Eisenstadt v. 
Baird,55 which involved a Massachusetts statute that made it a fel­
ony to give contraceptive medicines or devices to an unmarried per­
son.56 This was an ideal opportunity for the Court to extend the 
right of privacy to all individuals. Instead, t~e Court found the sus­
pect statute objectionable on equal protection grounds57 and did not 
use substantive privacy analysis to reach its conclusion. 
The difficulty in reconciling Eisenstadt with Griswold lies in the 
Court's variance in analytical approach: Griswold rested on substan­
tive due process grounds, while Eisenstadt was based upon the 
ground of equal protection. The only nexus between the two is 
found in dictum that indicates the Court's willingness to extend the 
application of Griswold's privacy right to an unmarried person: 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered 
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an in­
dependent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an associa­
tion of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and 
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is 
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from un­
warranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.58 
With this last sentence Eisenstadt added a new element to the pri­
vacy concept: the right to autonomy in decisions concerning matters 
that fundamentally affect one's life.59 Thus, it seemed that Eisen­
stadt "declared that the purpose of the zone established in Griswold 
was to protect decisionmaking of an intimate or fundamental nature 
and did not depend upon an intimate relationship such as marriage 
for its vitality."60 
While Griswold and Eisenstadt dealt with the status or existence 
of a relationship and its varying degrees of privacy protection, Stan­
ley v. Georgia61 dealt with the physical aspects and limitations of the 
55. 405 u.s. 438 (1972). 
56. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (West 1970). 
57. 405 u.s. at 443. The Court struck down the Massachusetts statute on equal 
protection grounds because the statute permitted contraceptives to be distributed to only 
married persons. 
58. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). 
59. Note, Fornication, CohalJitation andtlte Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REv. 252, 262 
(1978). 
60. Comment, supra note 14, at 1467. 
61. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley, an investigation of appellant's alleged book­
making activities led federal authorities to obtain a warrant to search appellant's home. 
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privacy concept. Stanley concentrated on a place-oriented privacy 
right and held that while "the States retain broad power to regulate 
· obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by 
the individual in the privacy of his own home."62 After quoting 
Olmstead, Justice Marshall elaborated, saying that an individual has 
"the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the pri­
vacy of his own home~"63 In this extremely broad language, the 
Court seemingly recognized wide freedom in intimate matters ifcon­
fined to the home. Thus, Stanley has been interpreted as saying that 
"socially condemned activity, excepting that of demonstrable exter­
nal effect, is and was intended by the Constitution to be beyond the 
scope of state regulation when conducted within the privacy of the 
home."64 Unfortunately, the Court has refused to extend the privacy 
right to such a liberal, albeit logical, interpretation65 and has con­
fined Stanley to its facts. 66 
During the 1973 term, the Court handed down two important 
privacy decisions. In Roe v. Wade,67 the Court explicitly reaffirmed 
the existence of the constitutional right of privacy that was broadly 
recognized in Griswold. "[T]he right of privacy, however based, is 
broad enough to cover the abortion decision. '..."68 While Justice 
Blackmun stated this privacy right is not absolute,69 the Court 
seemed to acknowledge a protected right of privacy in personal 
· decisionmaking. 
The Court was not, after all, choosing simply between the al-
While looking for evidence ofbookmaking activity, one of the federal agents found three 
· reels of film in a bedroom. The film was deemed obscene by the authorities. Appellant 
was convicted of ''knowingly hav[ing) possession of. . . obscene matter" in violation of 
state law. The Court declared unconstitutional the Georgia statute making mere posses­
sion of obscene material a crime. 
62. Id. at 568. 
63. Id. at 565. , 
64. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1975) 
(Merhige, J., dissenting), '!/I'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See also Note, supra note 59, 
at 275-76. 
65. See generally Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: Closing t"e J)oor 
to a Fundamental Rig"t ofSexual Privacy, 53 DEN. L.J. 553 (1976). 
66. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67-68 (1973). 
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Texas 
Penal Code that made it a crime to terminate pregnancy except where necessary to save 
the mother's life. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun declared that a woman's 
right to terminate her pregnancy is protected from interference by the state except in 
cases in which the state's interests in protecting the mother's health or in protecting po­
tentiallife become "compelling." Id. at 154. 
68. Id. at 155. 
69. Id. at 159. 
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ternatives of abortion and continued pregnancy. It was instead 
choosing among alternative allocations ofdecisionmaking authority, 
for the issue it faced was whether the woman and her doctor, 
rather than an agency of government, should have the authority to 
make the abortion decision at various stages of pregnancy . . . . 
[This] was instead a decision about who should makejudgments of 
that sort.1° 
There is little doubt that Roe "encouraged lower court accept­
ance of, and experimentation with, constitutional privacy."7l But 
Justice Blackmun limited this constitutional protection to those deci­
sions involving "fundamental personal rights that are related to mar­
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationship and child 
rearing and education."72 Through analysis of later Supreme Court 
decisions, it appears that this family-based formulation of privacy is 
the direction the Court will follow.73 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 74 placed additional limitations 
upon the privacy right. Paris, without overruling Stanley, declared 
that the states retained the power to regulate public obscenity.75 
This power to regulate public obscenity did not apply to regulation 
of the behavior of individuals within the privacy of the home.76 
While it seemed that, in Roe, the Court had extended the privacy 
right to protect not only that which was confined to the home, Paris 
backtracked and designated the home as one of the definite bounda­
ries on the zone of privacy. 
After collective analysis of these cases, it appears that the sub­
stantive aspect of the privacy concept is based on the premise that 
"certain 'intimate relationships' when confined to appropriate loca­
tions closely associated with the very nature of the relationship" de­
serve constitutional protection.77 The remaining unanswered 
70. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Te~Foreward: Toward a Model ofRoles in 
the Due Process ofL!fo and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. I, II (1973) (emphasis in original) 
(footnotes omitted). 
71. Silver, The Future ofConstitutional Privacy, 21 ST. LoUIS L.J. 211, 243 (1977). 
72. 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
73. See Silver, supra note 71, at 239 & n.73. 
74. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The Court in Paris held that exhibition of obscene material 
in places of public accomodation is not protected by any constitutional doctrine of pri­
vacy. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated that a commercial theater can be 
equated with neither a ''private home" nor a ''marital bedroom." Id. at 65. 
75. Id. at 67. 
76. Id. 
77. See Note, Application ojthe Constitutional Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dis­
missalsfrom Puhlic Employment, 1973 DUKE L. REv. 1037, 1044-45. 
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question is one of definition: What constitutes an "intimate 
relationship"? 
The Court avoided direct confrontation with this issue by up­
holding a district court sodomy conviction in Doe v. Commonwealth's 
Allorney.78 The significance of the summary affirmance has been 
the subject of much discussion.79 It has been proposed that the pro­
cedural posture of the case, or the standing of petitioners, made it 
inappropriate for a full opinion.80 Whatever the reason may have 
been, the Court, by its affirmance, based its decision on a lower court 
opinion ''that cited more dicta than doctrine and failed even to con­
front the constitutional issues involved."81 By failing to consider the 
analytical models already formulated by several courts,82 as well as 
failing to mention the vital constitutional precedents of Eisenstadt 
and Roe,83 the Court left no firm analytical basis to serve as a guide 
for the lower courts in their own privacy decisions. This accounts for 
the diverse and inconsistent privacy opinions in recent years. 
III. HOLLENBAUGH 
Inconsistent precedent faced the court in the Pennsylvania case 
of Hollenbaugh. Hollenbaugh focused on the status of heterosexual 
78. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), tifrd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
79. See Bazelon, supra note 21, at 617; Silver, supra note 71, at 256; Note, supra 
note 50, at 264-65. See also State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 216, 381 A.2d 333, 340-41 
(1977). 
80. Some commentators have proposed that the case was decided solely on 
standing or ripeness grounds, a suggestion perhaps made plausible by the 
Court's observation in Carey v. Population Services Inle17Ultiona/ that "the 
Court has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what 
extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual 
sexual] behavior among adults." 
Note, supra note 59, at 265 (footnotes omitted). 
81. Comment, supra note 65, at 574. The district court's opinion in Doe was based 
largely upon Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961), which 
when read in conjunction with Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold amounts to nothing 
more than a "eulogy of marriage." It has been said of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. 
Ullman that "his analysis intentionally was not subject to extension to analogous sexual 
intimacies such as '[a]dultery, homosexuality and the like' because they are not integral 
parts of socially established institutions. The logic of the analysis would, however, ap­
parently protect 'deviant' sexual conduct by married couples. . . ." Note, supra note 2, at 
1181. 
82. See, e.g., Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), tifrd, 539 F.2d 
349 (4th Cir. 1976); State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147, rev'd sub nom. 
State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107,547 P.2d 6 (1976); State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187,539 P.2d 
207 (N.M. App. 1975), rev'd, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976). These cases provide 
analytical models that examined all relevant privacy precedents, contrary to the analysis 
in Doe. See Comment, supra note 65, at 570. 
83. See Note, supra note 59, at 265-66. 
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relationships outside of marriage. Petitioners Rebecca Hollenbaugh 
and Fred Philburn both were employed at the state-maintained Car­
negie Free Library in Connellsville, Pennsylvania. Hollenbaugh 
served as a librarian and Philburn as a custodian; both were consid­
ered competent employees.84 Both were "at will" employees.85 In 
1972, after learning that Hollenbaugh was pregnant with Philburn's 
child, the couple decided to reside together. Due to her pregnancy, 
Hollenbaugh sought, and was granted, a leave of absence by the 
Board of Trustees. The Board had full knowledge that Philburn fa­
thered the child and that Philburn was married to another woman. 
Petitioners did not attempt to conceal their arrangement, nor did 
they advertise it. By their own testimony at trial, they conceded that 
the community was aware of their relationship and that there had 
been some local comment about it.86 
Responding to complaints from members of the community, the 
Board of Trustees held a special meeting on August 9, 1973 at which 
it voted to terminate petitioners' employment. The sole reason for 
petitioners' discharge was that they were living together in "open 
adultery."87 Petitioners contended that the discharge violated their 
constitutional rights based on the equal protection clause and the 
right to privacy.88 The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania used traditional equal protection analysis89 
in deciding that no fundamental right was abridged in petitioners' 
discharge.9O This ruling was affirmed on appeal without a published 
opinion.91 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in a seven-to-two deci­
sion,92 with Justice Brennan voting to grant review93 and Justice 
Marshall writing a lengthy and vigorous dissent to the denial94. Jus­
tice:. Marshall's dissent objecte~ to the outcome in Hollenbaugh on 
84. 436 F. Supp. at 1330. 
85. "[TJhe only contractual limitation on their employment being Ms. Hol­
lenbaugh's agreement with the Board of Trustees of the library that either party could 
terminate her employment with 6O-days' notice." Id. The board gave Ms. Hollenbaugh 
6O-days' notice. Id. at 1330 n.3. 
86. Id. at 1330-31. 
87. Id. at 1331. 
88. Id. at 1332-33. 
89. Id. See text accompanying notes 98-102 for a discussion of traditional equal 
protection analysis. 
90. 436 F. Supp. at 1333-34. 
91. 578 F.2d at 1374. 
92. 439 U.S. at 1052. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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three grounds: (1) The rigid, two-tier model used for equal protec­
tion analysis;95 (2) the penumbra of privacy's protection of the per­
sonal decision to live together;96 and (3) the lack of evidence 
presented adequately proving that the petitioners' living arrange­
ment adversely affected job performance.97 
A. Basic Methods ofJudicial Review 
Whenever there is a conflict between an individual liberty and a 
legitimate state .interest, a balancing analysis is employed on a case­
by-case basis.: Under typical equal protection analysis, a two-tiered 
system is used that, unfortunately, in many instances has a predeter­
mined outcome.98 Most laws, especially those with economic inter­
ests, are examined according to a "rational basis" test, which 
assumes the validity of a legislative judgment regarding the "means" 
used to arrive at a particular "end."99 Unless there is no rational 
nexus between the classification and the state interest, the statute in 
question will be upheld. 100 In applying this test, the court often con­
siders purposes that have not been articulated explicitly by the legis­
lature and will go to great lengths to hypothesize a valid state interest 
that would provide some rational connection between the means and 
the end. 101 The court almost always will give great deference to the 
legislature's choice of means. 102 
The second tier used is one of "strict scrutiny." Laws that dis­
criminate against a "suspect class"lo3 or infringe upon a fundamen­
tal right lO4 must survive strict scrutiny.105 The statute's use of a 
95. Id. at 1053-57. 
96. Id. at 1055-57. 
97. Id. at 1057-58. 
98. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1976) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
99. See generally Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection ofthe Lows, 37 CA­
LIF. L. REV. 341, 365-81 (1949); Developments in the Low-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. 
REv. 1065, 1076-87 (1969). 
100. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot 
Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 564 (1947). 
101. E.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611-12 (1960); Kotch v. Board of 
River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 563 (1947). 
102. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). See also 
authorities cited note 99 supra. . 
103. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Mc­
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 
646 (1948) (ancestry). 
104. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter,405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 533, 541 (1942) (right to procreate). 
105. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
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discriminatory classification or infringement on a fundamental right 
must be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest in order to 
survive strict scrutiny analysis. I06 If there is a less burdensome, al­
ternative means that can be used to meet the state goal, equal protec­
tion analysis demands that such alternative means be used. 107 
Because the outcomes of these tests are so predictable, Justice 
Marshall criticized this rigid, two-tier system and advocated a stan­
dard of scrutiny varying with the "constitutional and societal impor­
tance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized 
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is 
drawn."108 A third, intermediate form of scrutiny has been devel­
oped and utilized in gender-based discrimination cases. After sev­
eral decisions,I09 the Court finally established an intermediate level 
of scrutiny in Craig v. Boren .110 The Court asserted that "classifica­
tions by gender must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." III 
Although the Court tends to use language similar to that found 
in equal protection analysis, substantive due process scrutiny is theo­
retically different.112 While both involve balancing a personal free­
dom against a valid state interest, the system under equal protection 
is rigid, whereas the model used in due process analysis is flexible. 
Justice Harlan was the first to espouse a "flexible balancing" ap­
proach to substantive due process review. ll3 He felt that in order to 
determine the constitutionality of a law, the impact of the challenged 
law must be weighed against its proposed state interest. I 14 This view 
has been adopted by contemporary Justices who have addressed the 
106. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 658 
(9th ed. 1975). 
107. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
108. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 99 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
109. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 
(1971). ..
110. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, the Oklahoma statute prohibiting sale of 3.2% 
beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted gender­
based discrimination that denied males 18-20 years of age equal protection under the 
law. Id. at 191-92. 
111. Id. at 197. 
112. Developments in tlte Law, supra note 9, at 1194-95. 

lB. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 262-63 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 

114. Developments in tlte Law, supra note 9, at 1194-95. 
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nature of substantive due process review. I IS Thus, as an intrusion by 
the government further encroaches on a personal right, that personal 
right may be outweighed only by an increasingly substantial state 
interest. 116 
As Justice Marshall argued in his dissent to the denial of certio­
rari in Hollenbaugh, "administrative intermeddling with important 
personal rights [living arrangements] merits more than minimal scru­
tiny."1l7 This right clearly is one that falls into the category: "to 
engage in any of the common occupations of life." 118 He also argued 
that this right should not be "relegated to the minimum rationality 
tier of equal protection analysis, [which is] a disposition that seems 
invariably fatal to the assertion of a constitutional right."1l9 Justice 
Marshall advocated that the heightened, "substantially related" scru­
tiny be used here. 12o 
B. Sexual Privacy as a Fundamental Right 
Several approaches have been taken when attacking the prob­
lem of identifying sexual privacy as a fundamental right and deter­
mining the degree of protection it deserves. 121 There are two basic 
approaches to this inquiry that mest often are used: Traditional 
analysis and functional analysis. 122 Under the traditional approach, 
only those values traditionally "assumed to be part of our nation's 
scheme of liberty,"123 such as procreation and monogamous mar­
riage, are deemed fundamental and deserving of protection.124 
Viewing privacy in this way makes the determination of fundamen­
tal rights quite easy. The major problem with this approach arises 
when what is thought of as traditional changes with the times. 125 
115. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concur­
ring) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Har~, J., concurring in the 
result». 
116. For a complete discussion of equal protection and methods of review, see 
lJevelopments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1187-95. 
117. 439 U.S. at 1054-55. 
118. Id. at 1055 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923». 
119. Id. at 1056. 
120. Id. 
121. See lJevelopments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1270-96; Note, supra note 59, at 
266-96. See generally Wilkinson & White, supra note 17. 
122. See lJevelopments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1177-87. 
123. Id. at 1186; see Wilkinson & White, supra note 17, at 587-88. 
124. Wilkinson & White, supra note 17, at 587-88. 
125. "While tradition is not always easy to ascertain, it is easier to teU that a value 
is deeply rooted in American tradition than to determine that it is a valid proposition of 
moral philosophy, or that it is supported by a convergence of contemporary views 
amounting to consensus." lJevelopments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1187 (footnotes 
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"[T]radition is a living thing" 126 and that which is considered private 
and intimate changes from era to era and from culture to culture. 
From an historical perspective, the formal marriage ceremony was 
not regarded as the "essence of marriage." 127 The idea that the rela­
tionship, rather than the actual ceremony, was the true substance of 
a marriage is evidenced by the doctrine of common-law marriage, 
still recognized in some states. 128 This led to the conclusion that in­
formal marriage sufficiently resembles traditional marriage and mer­
its the same degree of constitutional consideration. 129 
Another approach to identify a fundamental right can be found 
in Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion to Griswold: 
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not 
left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private 
notions. Rather, they must look to the "traditions and [collective] 
conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so 
rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental." The inquiry 
is whether a right involved "is of such character that it cannot be 
denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions. . . ."130 
Thus, it may be hypothesized that the family no longer begins at the 
time of a formal marriage ceremony. 
The traditional approach is riddled with inadequacies; thus, the 
functional approach has become an increasingly popular alternative 
for many courts. l3l By using functional equivalents and analogies a 
strong argument for sexual privacy as a fundamental right arises. 
Basically, the proposition is that the constitutional definition of mar­
riage turns on the rationale underlying the protection of the tradi­
tional institution. 132 An informal arrangement also can share the 
truly significant characteristics of the traditional marriage: Intimacy, 
omitted). For example, Slavery was once considered a tradition, as was the separation of 
whites and blacks on buses and eating establishments. 
126. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961). 
127. f)evelopments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1291. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. See generally Note, Common Law Marriage and Unmarried Cohabitation: 
An Old Solution to a New Problem, 39 U. PITr. L. REv. 579 (1978). 
130. 381 U.S. at 493 (1965) (citations omitted). 
131. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform 
(OFFER), 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.s. 645 (1972). 
132. f)evelopments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1290. 
187 1981] PRIVACY RIGHT 
voluntary commitment, stability, and psychological involvement. 133 
In the heterosexual context, such a relationship has the procreative 
potential to develop a blood relationship.134 It has been argued that 
"one cannot avoid the conclusion that the sterotypical 'family unit' 
that is so much a part of our constitutional rhetoric is becoming de­
creasingly central to our constitutional reality."135 Assuming that 
the Constitution's concern is the family's function, the functional 
equivalents of the family, such as the unmarried couple, ought to be 
protected. 136 The Court, in the dictum of three cases, seemed willing 
to recognize these functional equivalents. In Smith v. Organization of 
Foster Families jor Equality & Riform (OFFER),137 the Court 
observed: 
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individu­
als involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attach­
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from 
the role it plays in "promoting a way of life" through the instruc­
tion of children . . . as well as from the fact of blood 
relationship. 138 
The Court further noted that even though the typical understanding 
of the word "family" involves some sort of biological tie, the impor­
tance of the family unit actually-stems from the emotional relation­
ships involved, which in no way require a biological bond.139 In 
Moore v. City of East C/eveland,l40 the Court protected the "ex­
tended family" because of its "functional role. . . in providing chil­
dren with social values and in protecting its members from economic 
and social adversity."141 Stanley v. Illinois l42 also recognized that 
family relationships ''unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony . . . 
[have] familial bonds ... [which are] often as warm, enduring, and 
important as those arising within a more formally organized family 
133. Id. at 1290-91. 
134. "Society's experience is generally thought to have been that such an agency 
[family unit] is most likely to flourish when its members are bound by sentiments and 
beliefs about the ties of blood." Note, supra note 59, at 288. 
135. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 987 (1978). 
136. Note, supra note 59, at 287. 
137. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (New York statutory and regulatory procedures for re­
moval of foster child from foster home did not violate the Constitution). 
138. Id. at 844 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972». 
139. Id. 
140. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (housing ordinance that limited occupancy of dwelling 
unit to members of a nuclear family declared unconstitutional deprivation of due 
process). 
141. J)evelopments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1217. 
142. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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unit."143 Thus, under this functional analysis, it would appear that a 

blood tie and a formal marriage are factors to be considered but are 

not dispositive of a "family relationship" deserving of constitutional 

. protection. The Court has implied that protection will be granted 

only after a determination of the degree by which this "family unit" 

provides intimacy, support, and protection for its individual family 

members. 144 
Looking at the issue on a more practical level, the best method 
for determining whether sexual privacy should be afforded funda­
mental status would be to combine the two approaches. Incorporat­
ing both the traditional and functional approaches would provide a 
formal marriage and blood tie with certain per se protection. There 
would be no need to show any of the qualities constituting a "func­
tional family unit" such as intimacy, support, and mutual interde­
pendence. On the other hand, the unmarried couple, or any other 
nontraditional family unit, would have to shoulder the burden of 
proving that the relationship possesses these qualities in order to be 
afforded the same constitutional protection. Thus, the qualities of 
intimacy, support, and mutual interdependence,. which are assumed 
to be inherent in the traditional marriage, must be proven to exist in 
the nontraditional family relationship. 
By using these two approaches to sexual privacy and some basic 
logical analysis, the Court has intimated that sexual privacy is a fun­
damental right. It would be illogical not to extend protection to sex..: 
ual privacy because the Court already has afforded protection to 
several sex-related decisions of unmarried heterosexual adults. 145 It 
then follows that this protection also applies to the underlying sexual 
relationships that give rise to these protected, sex-related decisions. 
Thus, it would appear that the unmarried, heterosexual relationship 
is protected. 146 
C. State Interests 
Once the status of a right has been determined, only half of the 
analysis has been completed. State interests then must be identified 
and balanced against these rights. The Supreme Court continues to 
143. Id. at 651-52 (citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968». 
144. See Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1218. 
145. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(contraceptives). 
146. In Hollenbaugh, this analysis is not fully applicable because petitioner 
Philbum is legally married. 
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formally acknowledge that domestic relations have long been re­
garded as a virtually exclusive province of the states. 147 Indeed, 
"state law will inevitably be encouraged to keep pace with shifting 
lifestyle trends or else risk evasion or irrelevance."148 In addition, 
the courts have accommodated current lifestyle changes, as evinced 
by the emergence of palimony awards and the increased rights of 
cohabitants. 149 The question of how constitutional law should ac­
comodate these changes has yet to be decided. 
Several justifications have been advanced by the state in an ef­
fort to regulate and restrict sexual activity outside of marriage, the 
least persuasive being the general promotion of morality. ISO This re­
quires the individual, as well as the courts, to "accept on faith, in the 
name of the police power, the state's moraljudgment."lsl While the 
Supreme Court's response has been ambiguous with regard to this 
interest,152 recent Court opinions indicate that these general state as­
sertions of "moral righteousness" are not sufficient to override a per­
sonal liberty.ls3 In United States Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno,IS4 the Court strongly intimated that it would be impermis­
sible to attempt the restriction of lifestyle choices on the mere basis 
of morality preservation. ISS This morality justification becomes 
more complex when other aspect~ associated with it are considered. 
Morality, besides serving as a societal standard, also is a prime ex­
ample of the paternalistic nature of the state in saving the individual 
147. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). 
148. Note, supra note 59, at 254. 
149. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 
(1976); Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973). See also Kay & 
Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 937 (1977); Com­
ment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1708 (1977). 
150. Wilkinson & White, supra note 17, at 617. 
151. Id. 
152. Chief Justice Warren once intimated in his dissent in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184 (1964), that there is a "right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent 
society...." Id. at 199. 
153. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); 
Wisonsin v. Yoder,406 U.S. 205 (1972). Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Yoder pro­
vides the most explicit evidence that state assertions of moral righteousness will be found 
wanting: ''There can be no assumption that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and 
others like them are 'wrong.' A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with 
no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different." Id. at 223­
24. 
154. 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (legislative classification of "household" did not further 
any governmental interest, but rather deprived unrelated household members of food 
stamp funds, and thus was not upheld). 
155. Id. at 535 n.7. 
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from self-inflicted harm.156 The Supreme Court of Alaska, in Ravin 
v. State, 157 has advanced a "none of their business" test. This court 
acknowledged that "[o]ne aspect of a privacy matter is that it is pri­
vate, that is, that it does not adversely affect persons beyond the ac­
tor, and hence is none of their business."158 
Courts never have determined what constitutes "their business." 
It has been advanced that there are only three interests that may be 
deemed sufficiently compelling to outweigh a fundamental right of 
sexual privacy: Deterrence of illegitimacy; prevention of disease; 
and preservation of the family unit. 159 The major inquiry in Hol­
lenbaugh was whether these intt:rests were sufficiently compelling to 
override the choice of personal lifestyle made by Hollenbaugh and 
Philburn. More importantly, it also should have been determined 
whether, through denying Hollenbaugh and Philburn the liberty to 
choose their domestic companions, the state accomplished its articu­
lated goals in the least burdensome way. The only interests focused 
on in this note as relevant to this case are the complementary inter­
ests of strengthening the institutions of marriage and the family. 
The institution of marriage has long been considered the "corner­
stone" of American society and always has enjoyed a special status 
in our legal system. 160 Awarding cohabitants the same status would 
"jeopardize the most hallowed and basic institutions of society." 161 
On closer analysis, the state's proper concern is not for the institution 
as much as it is for the basic functions performed by the family unit 
in society: "Sexual fulfillment and reproduction[,] . . . education 
and rearing the young, ... [and] economic support and emotional 
156. Wilkinson & White, supra note 17, at 619. This aspect of a morality justifica­
tion has been the subject of philosophical discord among commentators, debating the 
degree of power a state can assert over an individual where there is no evidence of exter­
nal harm. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (London 1965); H.L.A. 
HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (London 1963). The debates usually stem from 
the libertarian manifesto of John Stuart Mill, who advocated that ''the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to other." J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (London 1859). 
157. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). In assessing the constitutionality of an Alaskan 
statute prohibiting possession of marijuana the court utilized a Mill libertarian argument 
when it stated that ''the right of privacy in the sense of immunity from prosecution is 
absolute only when the private activity will not endanger or harm the general public." 
Id. at 500. 
158. Id. at 504. 
159. See Note, supra note 59, at 298-305 for a complete discussion of these state 
interests. 
160. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 17, at 569. 
161. Id. at 622. 
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security."162 
Hollenbaugh illustrated all the elements of this "functional fam­
ily unit," or at least the potential for this kind of unit which, in tum, 
merits protection. There is only one flaw in this analysis: Philbum 
remains legally bound to another woman. It appears that Philbum's 
marriage is no longer a viable relationship. This is obvious, as he no 
longer is living with his wife and has attempted to start a new life 
with Hollenbaugh. Thus, there can be little doubt that his first mar­
riage is no longer performing the functions that deem family unit 
protection. There is no legitimate state interest in trying to prolong a 
marriage that, effectively, has died. The only interest the state does 
possess is in ensuring that Mrs. Philbum is financially secure so as 
not to become a ward of the state. Depriving Philbum of his liveli­
hood does not accomplish this state goal. Sexual privacy is a funda­
mental right, and there is no compelling interest in this case to 
prevent the choice of lifestyle by petitioners. Prolonging a marriage 
that exists in name only cannot justify the deprivation of this free­
dom and does not substantially relate to the suggested state interest 
in protecting Mrs. Philbum. 
Although the issue of determining the state interest when one 
person in a relationship still is legally married to another is a poign­
ant one, the court in Hollenbaugh failed to address it. The only state 
interest advanced by the library and discussed by the district court 
was the library's ability to perform its functions in the community. 163 
Those precise functions, however, were never discussed. One can 
only assume from a reading of the opinion that the function of the 
library is to uphold morality. This is not a valid state interest and, 
thus, is not sufficiently compelling to override a fundamental right. 
Using Justice Marshall's intermediate tier of review, this justification 
is not substantially related to any articulated state purpose and can­
not override the right to sexual privacy. 
As Justice Marshall stated in his dissent, the district court never 
intimated that this disapproval of lifestyle by the community mem­
bers affected their use of the library.l64 More importantly, the court 
did not make clear that the library's interest in avoiding the appear­
ance of "tacit approval" of petitioners' relationship provided a ra­
tional basis for their discharge. 165 
162. Id. at 623. See also Murdock, TIle Universality of Ihe Nue/ear Family, in A 
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 37, 43 (rev. ed. N. Bell & E. Vogel 1968). 
163. 436 F. Supp. at 1333. 
164. 439 U.S. at 1057. 
165. Id. at 1056. 
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In sum, the sole, seemingly legitimate state interest-the protec­
tion of Mrs. Philburn-was not addressed by the court. Moreover, 
the only articulated interest of the library's function does not ration­
ally relate to the deprivation of the personal right of sexual privacy 
and certainly never would outweigh this fu~damental right under 
Justice Marshall's heightened standard of review. 
D. Limitations on Public Employment 
Public employees number nearly fourteen million and consti­
tute approximately five-and-one-half percent of the United States' 
labor force. l66 With so many people dependent upon the govern­
ment for their livelihood, the potential for abuse by the government 
of its employees' individual rights is great, especially if the govern­
ment is allowed to use its powers to infringe upon the constitution­
ally protected rights of its employees. 167 The major issue to be 
addressed is whether the private activities of a public employee can 
constitute valid grounds for dismissal. 
The power of the state to regulate conditions of governmental 
employment must not arbitrarily nor capriciously impair the right of 
the individual to have a private life separate from the job.168 Not 
only is the government prohibited from conditioning employment on 
the waiver of a constitutional right,169 but the Court also has an­
nounced that even where there is a legitimate state interest present, 
the government cannot invade the " 'sanctity of a man's home and 
the privacies of life.' "170 Accordingly, the courts are left to deter­
mine the kind of conduct that may be considered an adequate reason 
for dismissal. In Major v. Hampton,171 the district court asserted that 
there are some types of off duty conduct that may "seriously jeopard­
ize the ability of governmental employees to perform their duties or 
the capacity of the agencies employing them to adequately discharge 
their function."172 Such conduct may be a valid ground for the em­
ployee's discharge. 173 
166. Comment, The Unclear Boundaries ofthe Constitutional Rights ofPublic Em­
ployees, 44 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 389, 389 (1976) (citing Public Employment in 
1974, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce). 
167. See itl. 
168. Id. at 415. 
169. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). 
170. Mindel v. United States Civil Servo Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485, 488 (N.D. Cal. 
1970) (quoting Boyd V. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886». 
171. 413 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. La. 1976). 
172. Id. at 67. 
173. Id. 
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There is the added stipulation that the kind of off duty conduct 
that can be considered a valid basis for discharge must be limited to 
action that "at least rationally could be considered likely to discredit 
them or the govemment."174 With this example of the revitalized 
doctrine of substantive due process,175 certain demands must be met: 
"(1) That a dismissal or failure to employ not be discriminatory, ar­
bitrary, or capricious; (2) that it be based upon substantial evidence; 
and (3) that the grounds for the decision bear some reasonable rela­
tionship to the nature of the employment."176 
Thus, the immorality justification leading to dismissal, in many 
cases, will not bear even a rational relationship to employee job per­
formance. 177 In Hollenbaugh, where the protected sexual privacy 
right triggers a heightened scrutiny, this justification is even weaker. 
It has been ·acknowledged that "legitimate regulation of employee 
fitness and competence 'cannot be pursued by means that broadly 
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more nar­
rowly achieved.' "178 Thus, a standard of least restrictive means be­
comes mandatory when an employer tries to regulate private 
employee conduct. Any such regulation that infringes upon an "in­
dividual's zone of protected privacy will now be strictly scrutinized 
in order to determine whether the infringement is necessary for the 
accomplishment ofa legitimate state purpose." 179 After Roe, the pri­
vacy infringement must be essential to the achievement of a legiti­
174. Id.. 
175. The doctrine of substantive due process has a turbulent history. In the early 
1900's, a rational relation test became popular. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905), struck down the state's maximum hours law for bakers, symbolizing the rise of 
substantive due process as a protection of economic and property rights. For three de­
cades the courts used this substantive due process doctrine to determine the validity of 
laws relating to regulations of prices, labor relations, and conditions of entry into busi­
ness. For the next three decades many thought the doctrine had died, since no economic 
law had been invalidated on substantive due process grounds since 1937. Today, how­
ever, it is the use of substantive due process to protect economic and property rights that 
is discredited, not the doctrine of substantive due process as such. The fundamental 
values being protected are personal in nature as opposed to the economic interests pro­
tected earlier. This modem substantive due process is best illustrated by the recent deci­
sions protecting autonomy and privacy. Only in this area has the Court seen fit to act as 
a super-legislature and provide specific standards to be followed. In Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. at 163, for example, the Court established a trimester scheme to determine at which 
, point in a woman's pregnancy the state interests become sufficiently compelling so as to 
permit the state to interfere with a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. G. 
GUNTHER, supra note 106, at 548. 
176. Note, supra note 59, at 1049 (footnotes omitted). 
177. Id. at 1050. 
178. Note, supra note 67, at 1042. 
179. Id. 
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mate state objective; and that objective must represent a compelling 
state interest. 180 There must be a substantial showing of a direct re­
lationship between the employee's private conduct and his job per­
formance. In addition, the employee's record of past performance 
must be considered. 181 "If experience with !he employee up to the 
moment of discharge, has been untroubled, the . . . [government's 
action] becomes harder to sustain."182 
This reasoning 'supports Justice Marshall's contention that Hol­
lenbaugh was erroneous. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent, 
the decision of the court of appeals seems to be in conflict with other 
decisions. 183 One is that of Mindel v. United States Civil Service 
Commission, 184 in which a postal clerk's relationship with an unmar­
ried woman was protected and the termination of his job was held a 
violation of the privacy guarantee of the ninth amendment. 18S 
"Even if Mindel's conduct can be characterized as immoral, he can­
not constitutionally be terminated from government service on this 
ground absent a rational nexus between this conduct and his duties 
as a postal c1erk."186 Commentators have argued that the "insensi­
tive" nature of Mindel's job position was the determining factor in 
the court's decision. 18? For example, the private sexual rights of 
teachers have been infringed because of the sensitive nature of their 
positions, that is, providing role models and having daily contact and 
influence over formative children. 188 The sensitive nature of this job 
may constitute a legitimate state interest. 189 
In Hollenbaugh, dismissal was indeed invalid. As Justice Mar­
shall noted, petitioners were competent employees whose past per­
formance, at the very least, was adequate. 190 While Hollenbaugh's 
job involved contact with the community and the community was 
aware of petitioners' living arrangement, no evidence of similar pub­
lic contact was shown regarding Philbum's custodial job. Nor was 
180. Id. at 1050-51. 
181. O'Neil, The Private Lives ofPublic Employees, 51 ORE. L. REV. 70,103 (1971). 
182. Id. at 103-04. 
183. 439 U.S. at 1057-58. 
184. 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
185. Id. at 488. 
186. Id. at 487. 
187. E.g., Comment, supra note 166, at 406. 
188. Id. at 407-08. 
189. See Sullivan v. Meade County Independent School Dist. No. 101, 387 F. 
Supp. 1237 (1975), '!/I'd, 530 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1976). But see Andrews v. Drew Mun. 
Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975); Drake v. Covington County Bd. of 
Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974). 
190. 439 U.S. at 1057. 
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there evidence that his performance was affected by his extramarital 
relationship. 191 As Justice Marshall retorted to the proposition that 
the job performance was adversely affected solely due to community 
knowledge oftheir relationship, "[t]his reasoning reduces to the con­
clusion that Hollenbaugh was incompetent as a librarian because 
some members of the community disapproved of her lifestyle."192 
As in Mindel, there is no reason to dismiss either petitioner in Hol­
lenbaugh due to inadequate job performance. While a librarian ar­
guably holds a more sensitive position, it is not of the same degree of 
sensitivity as that possessed by a teacher because a librarian is not 
likely to exert as great an influence on children. With a record de­
void of evidence of impaired performance, there is no reason for the 
government to impose separate living arrangements as a condition of 
employment. Such an imposition not only abridges petitioners' asso­
ciational interests but also their child's interest in having a two-par­
ent home. 193 
IV. JUSTICE MARSHALL's DISSENT 
Justice Marshall's dissent to denial of certiorari in Hollenbaugh 
was both logical and well-reasoned. He alone addressed the three 
major flaws of the lower court's analysisl94 and attempted to provide 
a more logical conclusion. He felt that the question of sexual privacy 
is one that deserves both a heightened standard of review as well as 
protection under the penumbra theory first announced in 
Griswold. 19s 
The only flaw in this dissent arose because Justice Marshall ig­
nored the problem of appropriate standing of the parties. The 
Supreme Court, more than likely, would want a case where both 
parties are unmarried to fully address the subject of the unmarried, 
heterosexual relationship and the degree of protection that should be 
afforded this relationship. The added complication of Philbum's 
marriage is no easy hurdle to overcome. Although his marriage ob­
viously no longer is viable, the state still maintains an interest in 
protecting his legal wife. The question that remains is whether this 
interest is sufficiently compelling to warrant deprivation of the fun­
damental right to sexual privacy. This is a question that must be 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 1056. 
194. See notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text. 
195. 439 U.S. at JOSS-56. 
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addressed by the Supreme Court in order to provide the lower courts 
with the guidance needed to eliminate future inconsistent decisions. 
In Hollenbaugh, the Supreme Court not only denied certiorari 
but it let a lower court decision stand that did not: (1) Use the cor­
rect standard of review; (2) address the relevant state interest; and 
(3) provide substantial evidence to uphold a finding of inadequate 
performance on the part of petitioners to justify their discharge. 
Justice Marshall noted that there could be no distinction drawn 
between this case and any other afforded privacy protection in terms 
of the importance to petitioners of the personal decision involved. 196 
He also acknowledged that petitioners' right to pursue "an open 
rather than clandestine personal relationship and to rear their child 
together"197 closely resembled other aspects of privacy that already 
have been extended constitutional protection: ''That petitioners' ar­
rangement was unconventional or socially disapproved does not ne­
gate the resemblance [to other aspects of protected privacy] 
particularly in the absence of a judgment that the arrangement so 
offends social norms as to evoke criminal sanctions."198 As the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania repealed its laws prohibiting adul­
tery and fornification in 1972,199 there is no articulated state interest 
sufficiently compelling to justify the deprivation of the right to sexual 
privacy. Thus, Justice Marshall's conclusion is well substantiated: 
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari and judged the 
case on its merits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The right of privacy is at a critical point in its evolution and 
needs direction. The United States Constitution always has pro­
tected a person's right to be al) individual. "To a larger degree than 
most, our society claims to uphold each person's right to be different, 
to have opinions of his own and to make choices for himself."200 
Choices of personal association and sexual behavior express as much 
of an individual's uniqueness and individuality as do the way he 
speaks and the religion he chooses to practice, both of which are 
protected.201 If the concept of individuality or autonomy is to have 
future meaning, these personal choices also must be protected. 
196. Id. at 1056. 
197. Id. at 1055. 
198. Id. at 1055-56. 
199. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 334, § 5, 1972 Pa. Laws. 
200. Bazelon, supra note 21, at 589.. 
201. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 17, at 612. 
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Justice Marshall has taken up where Justice Douglas left off. 
He is the sole Justice on the present Court to consistently afford pro­
tection to the personal choices of an individual,202 thus promoting 
Justice Douglas' original privacy concept of personal autonomy. 
Justice Marshall alone has seen fit to extend the right of privacy to 
one of its logical conclusions: constitutional protection of consen­
sual, heterosexual relationships outside of marriage. His dissent in 
Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library,203 even with its occasional 
lapse in analysis, should be applauded for its' firm stand on privacy 
protection.204 As Justice Marshall so succinctly concluded: 
"[I]ndividuals' choices concerning their private lives deserve more 
than token protection from this Court, regardless of whether we ap­
prove of those choices. "205 
Susan M. Staff 
Like protection of First Amendment values, lifestyle protection attests to 
society's faith that a free market in lifestyles, as well as in ideas, best aids the 
individual in developing his own identity. And, as with the First Amendment, 
lifestyle protection may require defense of the most idiosyncratic among us in 
order to'discourage ... the state's natural inclination to compel its citizens to 
think and behave in orthodox patterns. 
Id. at 613. 
202. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1052 (Marshall, J., dis­
senting to the denial of certiorari); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 12 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
203. 439 U.S. at 1052. 
204. The only logical reason available to the Court for denying certiorari, not ad­
dressed by Justice Marshall, is standing. In Hollenbaugh, one petitioner was legally mar­
ried and thus, in a technical sense, committing adultery. The Court may have considered 
this particular case a poor vehicle for a full opinion on the merits of cohabitation. If the 
case had been one involving two single adults living together, the Court may have re­
sponded differently. 
While lack of standing is a valid reason for denial of certiorari, the privacy doctrine 
needs direction. The Court can not afford to wait for the perfect vehicle. Lower courts 
need guidance now. What privacy protection will be afforded to a consensual, heterosex­
ual relationship must be resolved as soon as possible. 
205. 439 U.S. at 1058. 
